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Diplomatic relations between the United States and Singapore date back to 1966, 
a year after the island-state’s independence. From 2001 to 2016, under the tenures of 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, relations between the two countries were 
stable, consistent, and positive, with interactions and collaborations spanning across 
multiple facets. Nevertheless, these stable relations should not be viewed as a natural 
course of affairs; U.S. relations with other Southeast Asian countries during the same 
period vacillated much like a pendulum.  
This thesis analyzes the reasons underpinning the stable relations between the 
United States and Singapore during the Bush and Obama administrations. The thesis, 
which draws on an issue-based comparative case study of two distinct time periods, 
contends that strong bilateral relations have been based largely on common security 
interests, with economic interests and common high regard for a rules-based international 
order being important aspects of their good relations. The close and stable bilateral ties 
between these two nations are particularly noteworthy because Singapore is not a treaty 
ally of the United States. This thesis concludes by citing potential risks to this stability 
posed by hypothetical political changes on each side of this relationship. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
During the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the United States 
approached Southeast Asia in very different ways. These different approaches have 
yielded a variety of responses from the region. Under President Bush, relations between 
the United States and the region seemed to suffer. The Bush administration’s 
preoccupation with the global war on terror and the Middle East, as well as its apparent 
disdain for regional multilateral institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), did not sit well with most 
Southeast Asian governments. In contrast, during President Obama’s tenure, relations 
between the United States and Southeast Asia seemed to improve sharply. The Obama 
administration’s clearly articulated policy position of pivoting or re-balancing toward 
Asia, coupled with its support for ASEAN and other multilateral set-ups, meant that U.S. 
relations with Southeast Asia vastly improved.  
While there were notable differences in the relations between the United States 
and Southeast Asian nations under the tenures of the two U.S. presidents, bilateral 
relations between the United States and Singapore seemed to be relatively stable. 
Diplomatic relations were cordial and positive, with several landmark bilateral 
agreements being signed under both administrations. These agreements supported 
cooperation in a multitude of areas, including information technology, health, counter-
terrorism, and counter-proliferation, among others. Ultimately, the evolution of such 
strong and positive bilateral relations between the United States and Singapore gives rise 
to the following research question: Why have U.S.-Singapore relations been so stable?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is significant for two reasons. First, the answer to the 
research question will enhance our understanding of the state of relations between the 
United States and Singapore from 2001 to 2016 and how relations evolved over this 
period. Although political leaders from both countries have often touted the great 
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importance of these bilateral relations, there has been little recent scholarship to support 
this claim. This research is interested in the cooperation and interaction between the two 
countries in the areas of security, defense, and economics, among others. Second, it 
contributes to the academic conceptualization of the reasons underpinning the state of 
relations between the two countries. In particular, this research seeks to explain why 
U.S.-Singapore relations have been stable, consistent, and positive over the last 15 years.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is divided into two parts. First, it reviews the literature on 
U.S.-Southeast Asia relations and U.S.-Singapore relations during the administrations of 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Second, it seeks to provide insights from 
current scholarship on the reasons for the relatively stable and positive relations between 
the United States and Singapore.  
1. U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations under the Bush Administration 
President Bush was the United States’ 43rd president from 2001 to 2009. Under 
the Bush administration, U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia has been described by 
scholars as “selective re-engagement,” “episodic,” and “crisis-driven.”1 The Bush 
administration was characterized mainly by its apparent dislike of dealing in multilateral 
settings like that of ASEAN, its narrow focus on the rise of terrorism in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, and its emphasis on the promotion of democracy and human rights. 
The Bush administration seemed to prefer dealing bilaterally with each Southeast 
Asian nation as opposed to dealing with ASEAN and its related multilateral institutions 
as a whole.2 Although this preference gave Washington more bargaining power as “the 
more powerful partner,”3 critics like Tommy Koh suggested that “the United States 
                                                 
1 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after 
Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 622–641; Tommy Koh, “The United 
States and Southeast Asia,” in America’s Role in Asia: Asian and American Views, 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/AmericasRoleinAsia2008.pdf, (2008): 37; Alice Ba, “Systemic 
Neglect? A Reconsideration of U.S.-Southeast Asia Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, 3 
(December 2009): 378. 
2 Koh, “The United States and Southeast Asia,” 42. 
3 Ba, “Systemic Neglect?” 381. 
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[gave] the impression that it [was] not willing to nurture relationships with nascent 
institutions which may not produce immediate results, and that it [was] not willing to 
show its Asian interlocutors respect.”4 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job opined that the 
Bush administration believed that the previous administration under President Bill 
Clinton had over-committed the United States in the region, and thus, the Bush 
administration sought to be more “selective” in its “re-engagement.”5 In the view of 
many Southeast Asians, the U.S. disdain for regional institutions was also exemplified by 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s absences at ARF’s 2005 and 2007 meetings and 
Bush’s cancellation of a long-awaited U.S.-ASEAN summit in 2007.6 Alice Ba, however, 
noted that there were exceptions: the Bush administration did continue the multilateral 
security cooperation laid down by his predecessor, in terms of its continued support for 
military exercises like CARAT, Cope Tiger, and Balikatan; Bush also sought to utilize 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to push forth the U.S. agenda for trade 
liberalization and political-security issues.7 In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that 
U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was first mooted by Bush.8  
The U.S. “episodic” and “crisis-driven” approach toward Southeast Asia during 
Bush’s tenure could be seen from his handling of the September 11 attacks and its “war 
on terror.” After the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah members who had links with the Al-
Qaeda terrorist network, as well as the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta in 2002 and 
2003, respectively, Washington noted the emergence of terrorist threats toward Western 
interests in the region and quickly made Southeast Asia “the second front” in its “war on 
terror.”9 While this emphasis brought about some form of security cooperation with the 
region, Southeast Asian elites leveled criticism on the aggressive nature of the U.S. 
                                                 
4 Koh, “The United States and Southeast Asia,” 43. 
5 Mauzy and Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” 628. 
6 Ba, “Systemic Neglect?” 378. 
7 Ibid., 383. 
8 Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: 
Policy Implications,” February 2012, 2, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2108399. 
9 Mauzy and Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” 629. 
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approach and argued that it was “misguided.”10 Certain Muslim-dominated countries also 
claimed that the U.S. “war on terror” was a war on Islam and “an excuse to project U.S. 
power into the region.”11 The U.S. approach of “for us or against us,”12 coupled with its 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan, dampened U.S.-Southeast Asia relations, especially with 
countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia where Muslims are the majority.13  
Relations between the United States and Southeast Asia were also affected by the 
former’s push for democracy and human rights within the region. Repressive actions 
against the monk-led demonstrations in Myanmar in 2007 led the Bush administration to 
call on the United Nations and its members to confront the Myanmar government.14 On 
the other hand, the Bush administration lifted sanctions against Indonesia, which had 
become a democracy, paving the way for the resumption of diplomatic ties and defense 
cooperation.15 As Ba suggested, although democracy and human rights are good ideals, 
Bush’s “blunt approach” to issues like Myanmar was at cross purposes to ASEAN’s own 
stance on the matter and put many Southeast Asian countries on the defensive as they 
remained concerned about U.S. interference in the running of their countries.16  
2. U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations under the Obama Administration 
President Barack Obama served as the United States’ 44th president from 2009 to 
2016. Under the Obama administration, the United States pronounced a clear policy 
toward Asia, that of pivoting or rebalancing toward the continent. In essence, this 
suggested a “transfer of resources and strategic attention from the Middle East and 
Europe to Asia.”17 In terms of U.S.-Southeast Asia relations, scholars have recognized a 
                                                 
10 Ba, “Systemic Neglect?” 377. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Mauzy and Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” 630. 
13 Ba, “Systemic Neglect?” 378. 
14 Robert Sutter, “The Obama Administration and U.S. Policy in Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: 
A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 31, no. 2 (August 2009): 210, doi:10.1353/csa.0.0050. 
15 Ba, “Systemic Neglect?” 388. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Euan Graham, “Southeast Asia in the U.S. Rebalance: Perceptions From a Divided Region,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 3 (2013): 307, doi:10.1355/cs35-3a. 
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much closer relationship between the two, with some describing the United States as 
“profoundly engaged” with the region.18  
Right from the onset of Obama coming into office, he seemed to place a clear 
emphasis on the Southeast Asia region, in particular, his intentions to strengthen ties with 
ASEAN. According to Satu P. Limaye, the United States took many steps before it 
formally articulated the pivot, or re-balancing, in 2011.19 Even before 2011, the United 
States signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), named a dedicated 
ambassador to ASEAN, publicly accepted ASEAN’s integral role as the leading 
multilateral institution in Southeast Asia, involved itself in the TPP, began to normalize 
relations with Myanmar, and articulated conscientious statements about the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea (SCS).20 Then in October that year, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy titled “America’s Pacific 
Century,”21 which laid down the U.S. official position toward the region and was a signal 
for increased U.S. interest in the South China Sea.22 
Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration made sure that the 
United States was fully engaged in the region’s multilateral organizations.23 Scholars 
have noted that the Obama administration’s “embrace of multilateralism” could be seen 
from the visits to the region by senior administration officials such as the secretary of 
state and defense secretaries.24 Obama also gave “considerable presidential face time” to 
ASEAN leaders by regularly attending the East Asia Summit and the APEC leaders 
                                                 
18 Satu P. Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2013): 48.  
19 Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 48. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 
22 Graham, “Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 306. 
23 Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 45. 
24 Graham, “Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 307. 
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meetings.25 This emphasis culminated with his invitation to the ASEAN leaders to 
California for a U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders’ summit in February 2016, the first ever to 
be held in the United States and the first between the two entities following the setting up 
of the ASEAN Community in 2015.26 Euan Graham, however, noted that the United 
States continued to give emphasis to bilateral relations, especially in the area of 
security.27 On a related note, Obama and his team also sought to reach out to countries 
like Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia—countries that the United States had “either not 
engaged or under-engaged for nearly a generation.”28 
While the official lines stated that there was a re-balancing toward Asia, critics 
wondered whether the commitment was “primarily rhetorical” and if it was limited only 
to defense.29 To this end, Graham observed that in 2012 the United States began to adjust 
what it meant by re-balancing by “widening the base of U.S. engagement efforts to 
include diplomatic and economic legs to match the already extended defence [sic] 
component.”30 In what were seen to be signals sent to the region, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton placed emphasis on the economics aspect of the rebalancing during her 
speech at the Singapore Management University in 2012, and President Obama made it a 
point to bring with him a big business delegation during his trip prior to the East Asia 
Summit in the same year.31 The United States has made efforts to “enhance ASEAN-
wide economic strength” and to increase U.S.-ASEAN economic ties, with the U.S.-
ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement and the TPP being examples of the greater 
commitment.32 
                                                 
25 “Joint Statement of the U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit: Sunnylands Declaration.” The 
White House. February 16, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-
us-asean-special-leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Graham, “Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 309. 
28 Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 44. 
29 Graham, “Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 307; Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s 
Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 46. 
30 Graham, “Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 306. 
31 Ibid., 308. 
32 Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 47. 
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Although the United States continued to advance democracy and human rights 
under President Obama, it has been observed that the United States preferred to pursue an 
engagement approach as opposed to its previous hard-handedness.33 Limaye noted that 
while critics might say that the United States has not been steadfast in these areas given 
the priority in politico-security interests, the United States has appeared to be more 
measured in its military engagements and its responsiveness given the democracy and 
human rights concerns that it has with certain countries.34 
3. U.S.-Singapore Relations 
The U.S.-Singapore relationship can be described in terms of its longevity, its 
stability, and its multi-faceted nature. The United States and Singapore commenced 
diplomatic relations in 1966, a year after Singapore’s independence in 1965; the two 
countries celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2016.  
To understand how these relations came about, it is useful to examine Singapore’s 
stance on its foreign policy. According to the late Michael Leifer, “Singapore’s leaders 
have consistently approached the matter of foreign policy from the conventional realist 
perspective of a small state obliged to cope with a world that was potentially hostile and 
without common government.”35 Leifer opines that it is the sense of “vulnerability” that 
heavily influences Singapore’s foreign policy path.36 Amitav Acharya argues that while 
Singapore’s foreign policy can be seen through a realist lens, there is evidence that 
Singapore uses “alternative conceptions of international relations, including liberal 
institutionalism and social constructivism” as well.37 Indeed, Singapore’s interests are 
often well served by its participation in international institutions where, as a small yet 
highly capacitated state, Singapore can participate in setting the rules of international 
                                                 
33 Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” 47. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000), 
98. 
36 Ibid., 1. 
37 Amitav Achaya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2008), 2.  
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cooperation in ways that redound to its benefit. Narayana Ganesan, who agrees with 
Acharya on this point, notes that Singapore’s overt foreign policy principles are “not 
underpinned by any particular philosophical doctrine or position.”38 Tan See Seng 
describes Singapore as a “smart power,” with its use of “policy pragmatism and its 
emphasis on deterrence and diplomacy” allowing Singapore to maneuver in the 
increasingly complex international landscape.39 Perhaps most indicative of Singapore’s 
foreign policy are the views of the current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who has 
shared that its “foreign policy is a balance between realism and idealism.”40 
In terms of U.S.-Singapore relations from the eyes of the island-state, Leifer 
argues that “Singapore’s relationship with the USA has been judged the most important 
among the major powers.”41 While Singapore’s predominantly realist outlook has meant 
that it set out to be self-reliant in the area of defense, the island-state clearly understood 
that there was a need to “base its balance-of-power strategy on borrowing political and 
military strength from extra-regional powers, principally the U.S.”42 The Singapore 
government has always held onto the belief that the United States is a benign global 
power that would provide a balance of power should China, India, or Japan decide to 
assert its power in the post-Cold War era.43 Generations of Singapore leaders have voiced 
their support of the U.S. role in the region, with founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
publicly stating that a strong U.S. presence was vital for “peace and balance in Asia,”44 
and current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commenting that even in a changing 
                                                 
38 Narayana Ganesan, Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 15. 
39 See Seng Tan, “Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore’s 
Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 332.  
40 Hsien Loong Lee, “8th S Rajaratnam Lecture on 27 November 2015” (lecture, Raffles City 
Convention Centre, Singapore, November 27, 2015), http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/pm-lee-hsien-
loong-8th-s-rajaratnam-lecture-27-november-2015. 
41 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 100. 
42 Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the U.S.: Not Quite Allies” Strategist, July 30, 2012, 
www.aspistrategist.org.au/singapore-and-the-us-not-quite-allies/. 
43 Achaya , Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 22. 
44 Keng Yong Ong, “Pursuing Mutual Strategic Interests: Lee Kuan Yew’s Role in Singapore-U.S. 
Relations,” RSIS Commentary, March 24, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co15064-
pursuing-mutual-strategic-interests-lee-kuan-yews-role-in-singapore-us-relations/#.VyxArWNlvUo. 
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regional environment, “America still plays a role which nobody else can play, holding the 
ring and fostering the stability of the region, enabling other countries to grow and prosper 
in a stable environment.”45 Scholars have described the relationship between the United 
States and Singapore as “security partners,” “quasi-allies,” and “indispensable 
partners,”46 clearly noting that their relationship is important yet less than a formal treaty 
alliance. Pang Eul-Soo described the two nations as having found “strong 
complementarity in each other’s strategic visions.”47  
U.S.-Singapore relations have remained relatively positive and consistent under 
the administrations of Bush and Obama. At the political level, U.S. and Singapore leaders 
have continued to enjoy close ties, as relations continue to be built upon pragmatism 
despite different leaders coming into office.48 While there was a reported diplomatic 
stalemate during President Clinton’s tenure as a result of Singapore’s restriction of 
foreign press and the caning of teen vandal Michael Fay,49 bilateral relations were warm 
under the administrations of both Bush and Obama, even when an outgoing U.S. 
ambassador openly criticized Singapore for “not allowing full participation of its 
citizens.”50 Acharya contends that U.S. leaders seemed willing to put aside their political 
differences for strategic reasons,51 which has in turn allowed Singapore’s political 
leaders’ access to top policy makers in Washington to remain unaffected.52 In a show of 
support for U.S. leadership in the region, Singapore leaders openly welcomed the U.S. 
rebalance to Asia, even going so far as to reject “the notion of the U.S. as a nation in 
decline” during Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s speech at the Chinese Central Party 
                                                 
45 See Seng Tan, “America the Indispensable Power: Singapore’s Perspective of America as a 
Security Partner,” Asia Politics and Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 120. 
46 “Singapore and the U.S.: Security Partners, Not Allies,” Strategic Comments, International Institute 
of Strategic Studies 19, no. 5 (2013): September 18, 2013, doi: 10.1080/13567888.2013.843343; Graham, 
“Southeast Asia in U.S. Rebalance,” 317; Tan, “America the Indispensable Power,” 119. 
47 Eul-Soo Pang, “Embedding Security into Free Trade: The Case of the United States – Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, 1 (April 2007): 1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 107. 
50 Achaya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 103. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ong, “Pursuing Mutual Strategic Interests.” 
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School in 2012.53 President Obama also hosted Prime Minister Lee at a state dinner in 
August 2016, in what analysts described as a “rare diplomatic honour” and a clear 
testament to the strong bilateral relations between the two countries.54 
In the area of defense and security, the United States and Singapore have 
extensive linkages, which they have strengthened in the past 15 years. In the wake of the 
September 11 attacks that shocked the world, Singapore was “prompt and unequivocal” 
in condemning the attacks; although it did not commit troops or any other form of 
material assistance, the Singapore authorities did offer to provide information and 
intelligence as well as stamping out the terrorists’ finances.55 Singapore was also the first 
Asian port to participate in the Container Security Initiative, where U.S. inspectors were 
allowed to check the U.S.-bound shipments for explosives and weapons of mass 
destruction.56 
After Singapore reportedly turned down a U.S. offer to become a major non-
NATO ally in 2003,57 President Bush and Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
announced that they would conclude a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) for a 
closer partnership in the areas of defense and security, which many observers hailed as a 
“major milestone.”58 The actual agreement was signed in 2005 between Bush and Goh’s 
successor Lee Hsien Loong, formalizing “the growing bilateral security and defense 
relationship in counterterrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
joint military exercises, policy dialogues, and shared defense technology.”59 This 
agreement was significant as it was the first of its kind with a non-ally since the Cold 
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War.60 Tim Huxley has commented that in the areas of defense and security for the 
United States, “cooperation with Singapore remained the closest and most far-reaching in 
Southeast Asia, reflecting Washington’s view that—semantics aside— the city-state was 
now effectively an ally.”61 Following the SFA, Singapore agreed to deploy its troops in 
Afghanistan as part of the U.S.-led coalition forces and contribute naval vessels to the 
Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy missions.62 According to Eul-Soo Pang, the United States 
views defense cooperation with Singapore as an important aspect in its global strategy to 
fight terrorism.63 On the other hand, Singapore has continued to gain access to defense 
technology from the United States, with the Republic’s US$1 billion purchase of 
Boeing’s F-15SGs in December 2005 coupled with a further US$800 million worth of 
ordinance, missiles, parts, and other supplies.64 
On the economic front, the United States and Singapore concluded a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), which came into force on January 1, 2004. Pang has argued that the 
two countries have overlapping interests, and through this FTA, they were trying to 
“embed security into trade ties.”65 He asserts that the United States concluded an FTA 
with Singapore as a reward for supporting U.S. foreign and security policies, which was 
significant as it was the first FTA between the United States and an Asian country.66 
Koh, who was part of the Singapore contingent for the FTA negotiations, has opined that 
the U.S. might have signed the FTA partly in recognition of Singapore’s close 
partnership as well as “the common worldview and threat perception” shared by the two 
countries.67 He has also intimated that Singapore wanted the FTA with the United States 
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for “a combination of economic and strategic reasons.”68 While the economic aspects 
were undoubtedly important for Singapore, it was also important “to entrench the 
presence of the U.S. in the region because it underpins the security of the whole Asia-
Pacific region.”69 In a more recent development, both the United States and Singapore 
are members of the TPP—a grouping of twelve Pacific Rim countries that make up 
around 40 percent of the world economy.70 As some analysts have put it, the TPP is seen 
to be the most concrete economic aspect of U.S. rebalancing toward Asia.71  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis focuses on identifying the causal factors underpinning the stable and 
incrementally stronger relations between the United States and Singapore. Three 
hypotheses have been identified. With the possibility that all three factors may be 
important, this thesis seeks to adjudicate the most dominant explanation among them. 
The three hypotheses are outlined as follows.  
Hypothesis One: A broad range of common security interests is one of the main 
underlying factors for the stable bilateral relations. This hypothesis proposes that the two 
countries find great commonality in their concerns on security and defense matters, both 
regionally and globally. Common security issues would include terrorism and the current 
territorial disputes in the SCS. This hypothesis asserts that the stable relations would no 
longer stand if there were no longer common security and defense interests. 
Hypothesis Two: A broad range of common economic interests is one of the main 
underlying factors for the stable bilateral relations. This hypothesis suggests that both the 
United States and Singapore pursue similar economic goals and see each other as 
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extremely important partners that would help grow and develop their economies. It 
suggests that economic interests are the fundamental driver of good, stable relations. This 
hypothesis asserts that U.S.-Singapore relations may cease to be stable if there were no 
longer value or opportunities for economic cooperation. 
Hypothesis Three: A common worldview, notably the strong emphasis on a rules-
based international order, is one of the main underlying factors for the stable bilateral 
relations. This hypothesis asserts that the United States and Singapore have thrived and 
arguably succeeded based on institutions built on the basis of executable rules and laws. 
Both countries have enjoyed steadfast relations with each other spanning decades. 
However, if either country fails to uphold the institution of rules and laws, it would affect 
the stability of their bilateral relations. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses comparative analysis to investigate the factors that explain the 
stable bilateral relations between the United States and Singapore. Relying upon an issue-
based comparative case study of two distinct time periods, the thesis focuses on the 
initiatives and responses of the two countries in the areas of security, defense, and 
economics, among others. The selected issues studied include the U.S. global war on 
terrorism as well as the negotiations for the SFA, FTA, EDCA, and TPP. These were 
chosen given that they were the major security, defense, and economic issues that arose 
during the tenures of Presidents Bush and Obama. This paper examines how the two 
countries conducted their foreign relations in these areas vis-à-vis each other, and 
whether or not there were reciprocal affirmative actions. The thesis also takes into 
consideration exogenous factors that took place during this period. Scholarly articles 
analyzing these issues are used, along with official statements and reports from both 
countries. These sources provide a sound basis for understanding the state of relations 
between the two countries and also illuminate patterns of behavior, if any.  
Essentially, this thesis tests the hypotheses against these contemporary case 
studies. It argues against the proposition that the stable U.S.-Singapore relationship does 
not have any fundamental basis for it to be so. Instead, there are real, fundamental 
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reasons as to why relations have been stable and, over time, have become incrementally 
stronger.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis aims to identify the reasons behind the stability in bilateral relations 
between the United States and Singapore from 2001 to 2016, specifically investigating 
the extent to which that stability is underpinned by common security objectives, common 
economic interests, and a common worldview and approach to international institutions. 
The findings provide a foundation for an assessment as to how stability can be achieved 
between a global power and a small nation-state that lies in Southeast Asia. Chapters II 
and III analyze the major areas of cooperation and ties between the United States and 
Singapore in the areas of security, defense, and economics, under the Bush and Obama 
administrations, respectively. These chapters provide not just the perspectives from both 
countries in these areas, but also seek to identify exogenous factors that might have come 
into play during these two periods. Chapter IV summarizes the reasons for the stable 
bilateral relations during the two presidents’ tenures, adjudicating among the three 
hypotheses, and thereby suggests implications of what could have an impact on the two 




II. U.S.-SINGAPORE RELATIONS UNDER 
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 
To understand the sources of stability in U.S.-Singapore relations under the 
tenures of Presidents Bush and Obama, we must examine the principal issues and key 
interactions between both countries and the way these relations have been managed. 
Chapters II and III focus on security and defense as well as economic dealings between 
the two countries under the two administrations and seek to identify the factors upon 
which the good, stable relations were based.  
This chapter discusses U.S.-Singapore relations during Bush’s two-term 
presidential tenure, from 2001 to 2009. The chapter examines the most significant areas 
of security and economic cooperation during this period and identifies the underlying 
reasons for the positive bilateral relations. 
A.  SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
The United States and Singapore improved upon their defense and security 
linkages during Bush’s tenure. The two areas of cooperation that featured prominently 
were the fight against transnational terrorism after 2001 and the signing of the Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA) in 2005. The September 11 attacks on the United States 
thrust transnational terrorism into the spotlight not only for the United States, but for 
countries around the world, not the least Singapore. Issues of terrorism continued to loom 
large in the years of the Bush administration, which contributed to the foundation and 
impetus for stronger defense and security ties between the two countries.  
1. Combating Transnational Terrorism 
U.S.-Singapore relations during the Bush administration were largely 
characterized by cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism. This issue 
unexpectedly forced its way onto Bush’s agenda in the early days. While not an entirely 
new threat to begin with, the September 11 attacks proved to be a turning point as they 
inflicted the heaviest civilian casualty toll in U.S. history. On that fateful day, the United 
States experienced attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and another that 
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resulted in the crash of a commercial aircraft in Pennsylvania. The death toll stood at 
2,977 people from 93 countries.72 The attack not only left the United States stunned at the 
nature of its execution and the resulting loss of innocent civilian lives, it also left the 
world bewildered as to how a global superpower could possibly be at the receiving end of 
such an outrageous attack on its home soil.  
The September 11 attacks made it clear that U.S. homeland security was under 
serious threat. They also gave a focal point to the Bush administration’s fight against 
terrorism, namely, to protect its own citizens in America and to win the terrorism battle 
overseas.73 To the Bush administration, it was clear that the United States was under 
attack because of its stance on “freedom and opportunity in the world.”74 As the joint 
statement of the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists” passed by 
the Congress articulated, “such acts [September 11 attacks] render it both necessary and 
appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United 
States citizens both at home and abroad”; the president also asserted the “authority under 
the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against 
the United States.”75 As Acharya has put it, “the September 11 attacks became a defining 
moment of international relations. They ended forever America’s sense of relative 
invulnerability to foreign non-nuclear attacks.”76  
Given the impact of the September 11 attacks on American society, the Bush 
administration was compelled to make its stance known. Shortly after the attacks, Bush 
declared a global war on terrorism (GWOT), and sought to build U.S. homeland security 
and a worldwide coalition that aimed at taking out terrorists known for targeting the 
United States—namely Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Bush administration sought the 
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support of every nation in its fight against terrorism, requesting for concrete actions 
rather than mere rhetoric.77 In an address to a joint session of Congress and the American 
people on September 20, 2001, Bush said that “we [the United States] ask every nation to 
join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, 
and banking systems around the world.”78 Bush sought to build a wide coalition of 
supporting states, highlighting that “any nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be 
regarded as a hostile regime.”79 The U.S. government set out to do everything possible to 
eradicate transnational terrorists, including the pursuance of war with the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, which it believed was the mastermind of the September 11 
attacks. On its home front, the USA PATRIOT Act, which was an acronym for Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism, was also passed by the U.S. Congress in October 2001 to help the 
authorities detect and prevent terrorism.80  
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Singapore was quick to lead in the 
condemnation of the terrorist attacks and supported the rights of the U.S. government to 
launch retaliation against the perpetrators.81 Singapore threw its weight behind the U.S. 
strike against the Taliban in Afghanistan by explicitly pointing to the U.S. right to self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, with its Permanent Representative to the 
U.N., Kishore Mahbubani, issuing an official statement that read in part, “all countries 
have an inherent right to self-defense. The military action by the United States and its 
coalition partners against Afghanistan is in conformity with U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1368 of September 13. It is a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 51 of 
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the U.N. Charter.”82 Singapore’s political leaders had sought to influence the U.S. course 
of action and create legitimacy for its war on terror by advising the superpower to build a 
coalition that did not include only its usual allies, but also Muslim states and Third World 
countries.83 
Other than mere rhetorical support, Singapore provided its support to the United 
States in the war on terrorism through being a value-added partner of U.S. efforts. 
Although it did not provide material assistance, nor was it asked to do so, the island-state 
provided the United States critical intelligence about terrorist organizations in the 
region.84 Security agencies in both countries worked closely on the sharing of operational 
intelligence, with the uncovering of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cell and the arrests of its 
operatives being one of the highlights of their close cooperation. These arrests were 
especially significant, as these operatives had sought to attack U.S. targets, such as the 
U.S. embassy and military vessels, on the island.85  
Singapore also signed a declaration to be part of the U.S.-led Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) in September 2002, an effort “designed to enhance the security of global 
maritime shipping, a vital link in world commerce.”86 CSI was the U.S. government’s 
initiative to prevent terrorist organizations from using containers to deliver weapons of 
terror that might be used against the United States.87 By participating in this initiative, 
Singapore allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at its port to 
screen U.S.-bound cargo containers before they left for the United States. Singapore’s 
participation was significant on several counts given that it was the first country in Asia 
to join this initiative, and that its port is one of the largest in the world in terms of 
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transshipment and transit given its geographic location. It was estimated at the time of the 
signing that 330,000 sea cargo containers came into America via Singapore.88 Singapore 
also became a firm supporter of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a 
multinational effort designed to stop the flow of weapons of mass destruction and their 
related systems and materials. Started in May 2003, the PSI strategy had its origins in the 
U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 
2002.89 Given Singapore’s geostrategic location and its proximity to the vital sea lanes of 
communication in the Southeast Asian region, its participation helped lend credence to 
this initiative and provide a footing for PSI efforts to be launched in this important 
shipping route. As of 2005, 13 countries were part of the initiative, with Singapore being 
the only country from Southeast Asia.90 The island-state was an active participant in the 
PSI, and hosted the PSI exercise codenamed DEEP SABRE in 2005.91 
Singapore has played an active international role toward countering terrorism, 
through warning other states of the severe implications and encouraging them to be 
responsive to global efforts. The island-state has been a strong advocate for counter-
terrorism efforts that were largely aligned with American efforts within ASEAN, 
especially compared to its neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, which had to quell anti-
American protests among their Muslim constituents given the GWOT’s perceived anti-
Islamist character. Singapore’s senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew, emphasized Southeast 
Asia’s strategic significance in the fight against terrorism, encouraging neighboring 
countries not to close an eye to Al-Qaeda members taking refuge within their borders.92 
In December 2001, Singapore was among the first countries to report on its 
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implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which required states 
to amend their national laws such that they were consistent with the international 
conventions on terrorism.93 In the words of Minister for Foreign Affairs S. Jayakumar, 
“this was a landmark resolution which dealt comprehensively with counter-terrorism,” 
providing “a legal basis for all states to take legal action against terrorists and their 
supporters.”94 Efforts were also made to limit the financial resources flowing to these 
groups.95 Singapore also signed the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism in the same month, committing to stamping out terrorism 
financing, with its central bank instructing banks to tighten procedures to counter money 
laundering.96 
In the subsequent years under the Bush administration, the emphasis on the fight 
against transnational terrorism remained as the threats continued to loom large. The Bali 
bombing in 2002, the Jakarta bombing in 2003, the Madrid bombing in 2004, and the 
further arrests of JI operatives in Singapore ensured that terrorism remained a top security 
priority for both the United States and Singapore. The United States continued to pursue 
its war on terror, even if there was really no single war. In 2003, the U.S. government 
decided to launch an attack on Iraq, which allegedly possessed weapons of mass 
destruction.97 Bush claimed the attack on Iraq to be a critical part of the war on terror.98 
Singapore was supportive of the U.S.-led efforts in Iraq, as it was cognizant of the impact 
of illegal weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of rogue state and non-state 
actors.99 For its part, Singapore sent 998 of its military service members to Iraq from 
2003 to 2008 under Operation BLUE ORCHID for the reconstruction of Iraq, supporting 
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areas such as air-to-air refueling of aircraft, protection of key offshore installations, and 
the training of the Iraqi armed forces.100 The Singapore political leadership saw the 
instability of the Gulf region as having an impact of the stability of Southeast Asia and 
sought to play a contributory role in international peace support missions. 
Singapore’s efforts in dealing with the threat of terrorism can be summarized in 
its efforts on three fronts: homeland security, bilateral cooperation, and multilateral 
measures.101 Characterizing terrorism as “the most immediate security threat facing the 
region,” the Singapore government took active steps to improve upon its own security 
stance.102 On its home front, the authorities were cognizant that the old model of working 
in silos would have to make way for a more coordinated approach among policy, 
security, and intelligence agencies.103 The authorities were quick to recognize that its 
support for the United States in fighting global terrorism and its perceived close relations 
with the global power had made it a “prime target” for terrorists.104 Singapore would now 
have to prepare itself to fight “low-intensity and terrorist threats” that seemed to be more 
prominent concerns than they had been a few years ago.105 The Singapore government 
made efforts to educate its people on the threat of terrorism, going to the length of 
publishing the National Security Strategy for Singapore, a document meant to explain to 
its people the continuing threat of transnational terrorism, its impact on Singapore, the 
government’s strategy for combating terrorism, and how its people can play a part.106 On 
the bilateral front, other than the close cooperation with the United States, Singapore 
sought to extend its cooperation in countering terrorism with its immediate neighbors, 
such as Malaysia and Indonesia, mainly in the area of intelligence sharing.107 On the 
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multilateral front, Singapore sought to be a strong proponent of fighting terrorism using 
the framework of ASEAN, ARF, and APEC,108 with efforts that were largely in line with 
the U.S.-led efforts. Singapore was also a key player in establishing the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 
meant to bring neighbors together to cut down on sea crimes.109 
a. Reasons for the United States to Cooperate with Singapore  
The emergence of threats against the United States coming from Al-Qaeda 
affiliated terrorist cells in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore was a wake-up call 
for the Bush administration, as the region was quickly labeled as a “critical second front” 
in its war on terrorism.110 Bush and his team were quick to realize that the threat of 
transnational terrorism was not confined to just its homeland; this threat had its sights set 
on U.S. interests and assets around the world, including Asia. The United States needed 
practical support from the regional countries to thwart the efforts of these terrorists. To 
this end, Singapore had been forthcoming in providing intelligence and practical 
cooperation in support of U.S. efforts. As mentioned previously in this chapter, this close, 
practical cooperation uncovered potential bomb attacks on the U.S. embassy, military 
vessels, and U.S. Navy personnel in Singapore. If the attacks had taken place, the world’s 
confidence in the U.S. ability to fend for itself and uphold its status as a global 
superpower would have been greatly undermined.  
The Bush administration’s proclamation of Southeast Asia as a “second front” on 
its war on terror meant that it needed vocal support from countries in the region itself to 
bolster the legitimacy of its campaign. To this end, Singapore provided its unwavering 
public support through its leaders, in comparison to its neighbors. While the regional 
countries denounced the September 11 atrocities, the response from the region toward 
U.S. war on terror was somewhat mixed. Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia was a 
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strong critic of the Bush administration for its use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan, with 
Indonesia—the most populous Muslim nation in the world—singing the same tune.111 
Both countries had to contend with serious domestic opposition to U.S. actions and did 
not want to appear to be in collusion with the Americans for fear of domestic political 
backlash. While the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore all backed U.S. actions, it 
would appear that Singapore’s support was especially appreciated by Washington given 
that it was not a treaty ally and thus not beholden to U.S. military and economic aid 
packages, something that academics had observed that the Philippines under Arroyo had 
taken the opportunity to benefit from financially when it declared its support.112 
Singapore’s unequivocal support toward U.S. actions, both in actions and in words, 
together with the consistent and steadfast nature of its relations over the years, meant that 
Singapore was a key strategic partner for the United States as it sought to widen its 
support base in the region and build legitimacy in the war against terror. 
b. Reasons for Singapore to Cooperate with the United States 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Singapore conducted its own 
assessment regarding this emerging threat of terrorism. First, Singapore was clearly 
concerned about its own security. While it had its own brushes with terrorism previously, 
the arrests of thirteen members of JI shortly after the September 11 attacks made it clear 
that the island-state had to guard against such risks.113 The planned JI attempt to make 
seven truck bombs using 17 tons of ammonium nitrate would have been the most 
catastrophic terrorist attack since September 11 had it not been foiled.114 The emergence 
of transnational terrorism, according to Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister 
for Security and Defense Tony Tan, presented “a serious and prolonged threat to 
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Singapore’s national security.”115 The Singapore authorities were clear that, alone, the 
country might not be adequate to fight against transnational terrorism as it was a threat 
that all states needed to work together to eradicate.  
Second, terrorism in Singapore’s own backyard would have a devastating impact 
on its economy. Politicians and academics alike have pointed to Singapore’s dependency 
on global trade and asserted that its economy might not be able to withstand the negative 
impacts should terrorism take place or take root on the island-state. As Andrew Chau has 
put it, “Singapore’s externally oriented economy relies heavily on foreign direct 
investment, which would recede if security concerns like terrorism became an issue.”116 
Moreover, multinational corporations have primarily chosen Singapore as their regional 
headquarters due to the island-state’s political stability and security, which if 
undermined, could see valuable investment dollars being diverted away.117 
Given its realist mindset, it could be argued that the city-state would have taken 
the steps to counter the terrorism threats that it was facing, with or without the United 
States taking the lead. As Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked, 
Singapore’s pragmatic stance toward countering terrorism was “for our [Singapore’s] 
interests” and not just because Singapore was a supporter of the United States.118 There 
was grave concern that Singapore’s status as a thriving trade hub could not withstand the 
impact of terrorism, let alone prosper.119 Admittedly, it would have been an 
insurmountable task if Singapore had tried to do it alone, especially if its neighbors or the 
United States were not concerned about the consequences of terrorism. The fact that the 
United States was leading the charge and gathering a coalition of countries to combat the 
rising threat of terrorism meant that Singapore could seek to pursue goals that were 
similar to its own. Following the U.S. lead in these efforts provided a good proposition 
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for Singapore given the strong coalition that was built would likely create better 
cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms that would be useful for the island-state 
and the region. 
2. Strategic Framework Agreement  
Besides the GWOT that featured strongly in U.S.-Singapore relations during the 
Bush administration, the successful conclusion of the SFA pointed to the deepening of 
bilateral relations between the two countries. The idea of the SFA was first announced by 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and President Bush in October 2003. The agreement was 
meant to put forth “the principles of the U.S.-Singapore defense partnership and the key 
areas of defense cooperation,” giving an overarching framework to the basis of 
cooperation for many of the existing partnerships and set the stage for future 
collaborations.120 Areas that were being expanded included “counter-terrorism, counter-
proliferation, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues, and defense 
technology.”121 With this agreement in place, Singapore had now become a “Major 
Security Cooperation Partner” of the United States.122 
Two aspects of the SFA were of note—the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) and a Protocol of Amendment to the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding 
(AMOU). The DCA allowed both countries to have a deeper appreciation on their mutual 
importance through a timely stock take and overview of the breadth and depth of their 
defense relations. Building on these many areas of cooperation, the DCA sought to 
develop “military expertise and defense capabilities to deal with the wider range of non-
conventional threats.”123 To this end, the DCA formalized a yearly Strategic Security 
Policy Dialogue to allow senior defense officials from both countries to discuss and 
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exchange views on defense and security issues, and seek new areas of cooperation.124 
Being cognizant of the rising importance of defense technology, the DCA was also 
designed to facilitate technology sharing and collaboration through the means of joint 
technology projects and concept development and experimentation, thereby helping both 
countries create a technological edge over potential adversaries.125 The AMOU provided 
an update of the 1990 U.S.-Singapore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 
covered the conditions of granting access to U.S. Navy ships and aircraft to facilities in 
Singapore.126 This memorandum was significant in that it renewed the official military-
to-military arrangements for both countries, given that the 1990 MOU only had a lifespan 
of 15 years and was due for a review in 2005. With the overarching SFA in place, all 
defense relations and cooperation were now effectively under the new ambit and 
recognized by the two countries. 
a. Reasons for the United States to Sign the SFA with Singapore 
The United States had strategic reasons for wanting to sign the SFA with 
Singapore. First, it had wanted to continue its “places-not-bases” strategy, “a concept that 
[allowed] the U.S. military access to facilities on a rotational basis without bringing up 
sensitive sovereignty issues.”127 Following its withdrawal from the Clark and Subic bases 
in 1991, the U.S. military had relied extensively on Singapore as its military base in the 
region. The signing of the SFA would allow the U.S. military to gain continued access to 
important logistical support, use of a naval base for its aircraft carriers, as well as an 
airfield in the Far East.128 Although the United States had treaty allies like the Philippines 
and Thailand, political instability in these countries meant that they could not count as 
steadfast support for the U.S. interests in the region. Both countries had also withdrawn 
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their humanitarian deployment in the U.S.-led efforts in Iraq, further leading the United 
States to believe that it could not be count upon those countries in times of need.129 
The U.S. signing of the SFA was also to further its relations with Singapore and 
reward the island-state’s unwavering cooperation in the areas of security and defense. 
Through the years, Singapore had been a strong advocate for U.S. presence in the region, 
and had proven to be an important supporter for U.S.-led initiatives such as the GWOT. 
Singapore’s public showcase of its support for U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
as well as its contributions in terms of sending its military for non-combat roles, had 
helped to provide an important Southeast Asian representative in its counter-terrorism 
efforts. Bolstered by Singapore’s willingness and ability to respond to and support 
initiatives like the CSI and the PSI, the United States was understandably keen to 
consolidate Singapore as an important defense partner in the region. It was reported that 
the United States had actually offered Singapore the status of a major non-NATO ally in 
2003, only for the island-state to decline the offer.130 The gesture of offering the status to 
a small country like Singapore further lent weight to the fact that the Bush administration 
viewed Singapore as an important security partner, and that it was still clearly interested 
in furthering and strengthening its relations with the island-state.  
b. Reasons for Singapore to Sign the SFA with the United States 
Singapore had its reasons to conclude the SFA with the United States. First, 
Singapore was concerned about its regional security, which had a direct impact on the 
country. Concerned with the rise of China, Japan, and India, Singapore had always been 
an ardent supporter of the U.S. “stabilising and benign” presence in Asia and had often 
voiced its concern on how a power vacuum in the event of a U.S. withdrawal would 
potentially create an influx of instability in the region.131 Singapore’s view was that if the 
United States were to pull out from the region, it was likely that Japan would re-arm 
itself, causing a security spiral from China and Korea that would ultimately cause 
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regional instability.132 Without stability in its neighborhood, Singapore’s own security 
would come under threat and its economy would take a beating, given its high 
dependence on international trade.  
Second, Singapore was also concerned about its own security. The city-state had 
consistently regarded U.S. involvement in its vicinity as of strategic importance, 
especially so given its sometimes troubled relations with its neighbors.133 Singapore’s 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia were strained, especially after the 1997 regional 
economic crisis over issues of aid.134 With Malaysia under Mahathir before 2004, 
Singapore had many issues and disputes with its closest neighbor, ranging from prices of 
water in their existing contracts, land reclamation, use of air space, and the like.135 The 
changes in political leadership in Indonesia after 1998 also created instability within the 
biggest country in Southeast Asia, with President Habibie famously deriding Singapore 
as a “Little Red Dot,” and another, President Abdurrahman Wahid, threatening to cut off 
water supplies even though Indonesia had no water dealings with the island-state to begin 
with.136 The troubled relations had often made Singapore and its leaders feel uncertain 
and vulnerable to its neighbors’ intentions. Singapore’s bilateral relations with both 
Malaysia and Indonesia looked to be on the mend in 2004, and this was in part following 
Abdullah Badawi and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono taking the political helm in their 
respective countries. While there seemed to be better days in relations with its neighbors, 
Singapore’s close defense ties with the United States would help lend weight to the 
island-state’s defense should relations with its neighbors go awry in the future, as it 
would change the calculus for Singapore’s potential aggressors.  
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Third, Singapore had wanted to maintain its strong defense relations with the 
United States and potentially to gain privileged access to advanced U.S. military 
technology and training space. The Republic of Singapore Air Force’s (RSAF) major 
equipment until then, such as the F-16 fighters, the KC-135 tankers, and the CH-47D 
helicopters, were all purchased from the United States.137 The signing of the SFA helped 
formalize this aspect of the bilateral relationship and provide assurances for continued, 
privileged defense transfers between the two countries. Other than military technology 
transfer, an important area in which Singapore was dependent on the United States was 
its provision of long-term training opportunities for the RSAF.138 The need to house its 
training overseas stemmed largely from Singapore’s lack of training airspace and 
facilities.139 The opportunity to train with the U.S. Air Force had undoubtedly helped 
improve the operational readiness of the RSAF, and the signing of the SFA would help 
lengthen and broaden the training opportunities that the RSAF had with the United 
States.140 
B. ECONOMIC 
The United States and Singapore have enjoyed longstanding and close economic 
ties since their establishment of diplomatic relations in 1966. During the Bush 
administration, a significant step toward closer and formalized economic ties came in the 
form of the signing of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) in 2003, 
with the agreement coming into effect on January 1, 2004.  
1. U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement  
The USSFTA was a landmark agreement given that it was the first FTA that the 
United States had with an Asian country, and the second with a fully developed country, 
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after Canada.141 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong made the suggestion of a bilateral FTA 
to President Clinton on the sidelines of an APEC Leaders’ Meeting in 2000.142 Clinton’s 
agreement led to the issuance of a joint statement on the start of the negotiations of the 
USSFTA. Given that it was by then the last couple of months of the Clinton 
administration, the actual negotiations were followed through by the Bush administration, 
which was also supportive of such an initiative with the island-state.143 
The USSFTA was intended to promote trade and investments between both 
countries. Under the USSFTA, Singapore agreed to eliminate tariffs on goods originating 
from the United States with immediate effect, while the United States agreed to remove 
tariffs on Singapore’s goods over a period of ten years.144 The final USSFTA consists of 
around 1,400 pages of documentation, covering 21 chapters in the areas of trade in goods, 
textiles and apparel, rules of origin, services, investment, competition policy, intellectual 
property, e-commerce, customs cooperation, government procurement, etc.145  
The USSFTA was comprehensive and had some key provisions. In the services 
area, both countries agreed to open up many of their sectors and provide more in-depth 
access to the other party.146 It was also agreed that the treatment given to each other’s 
services suppliers would be as well as if it was from its own country.147 In the area of 
Intellectual Property Rights, the USSFTA also adopted the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights, thereby providing robust 
safeguards for industries that dealt with state-of-the-art technologies.148 There was also a 
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segment on enhanced transparency that improved regulations and business transactions, 
thereby creating both established check-and-balance procedures and fairness in 
commercial dealings.149 There were many other features in this USSFTA, and in sum, the 
agreement was a blueprint that was envisioned to help both countries thrive 
economically.   
a. Reasons for the United States to Sign the USSFTA with Singapore 
The United States had many reasons to sign the USSFTA with Singapore, ranging 
from strategic and political to economic, although the official lines that came from the 
U.S. Trade Representative included an idealistic perspective on why the United States 
wanted to embark on such trade arrangements. According to Ralph F. Ives, the chief U.S. 
negotiator of the USSFTA, the policy of the Bush administration was “to seek trade 
liberalization on a global, regional, and bilateral basis and to pursue FTAs with countries 
in every region—Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.”150 It was hoped that 
dealings and interactions through the use of trade between people would help achieve 
“world prosperity, peace and security.”151 For the record, the United States under the 
Bush administration signed eighteen FTAs, the most of any two-term president to-
date.152 
The United States also signed the USSFTA with Singapore for strategic reasons. 
The United States was keen to ensure that its influence in Southeast Asia would not wane 
in the face of a rising China that sought to woo its neighbors. The need to engage its key 
partners like Singapore was thus important. The island-state had thriving economic 
relations with China, being ranked as China’s number one trade and investment partner in 
Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War.153 The two-way trade between Singapore 
and China amounted to $2.9 billion in 1990, and by the late nineties, it surged to $9.6 
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billion.154 In order to ensure that U.S. influence in the region did not subside, it was 
important for the United States to formalize relations with Singapore, one of its key 
partners in the region; a trade agreement such as an FTA fits the bill. As both Ives and 
Koh have pointed out, a successful completion of the USSFTA could also serve as a 
template for other FTAs that the United States would sign with other Asian countries.155 
The signing of this FTA with Singapore would facilitate U.S. engagement in Asia, 
sending a clear signal that the United States remains interested in the region.  
The U.S. signing of the USSFTA could also be seen as politically motivated; the 
Bush administration had wanted to consolidate Singapore as a supporter of its initiatives 
and efforts, thereby strengthening their relationship. According to Pang, the United States 
had used “FTAs as political rewards for countries that support U.S. foreign and security 
policies.”156 In terms of the USSFTA, he reasoned that the United States had been 
willing to sign off the agreement in part due to Singapore’s long-term support for U.S. 
military endeavors in the region, such as the granting of access rights to the U.S. military 
since 1990 and Singapore’s ardent support on the U.S.-led war against terrorism.157 Both 
countries acknowledged that the signing of the FTA was a “logical sequel” to the 
longstanding security relations.158 Pang also postulated that this FTA move was part of 
Bush’s wider strategy to “embed security into trade relationships,”159 something that in 
his opinion was “less about economics and more about consolidating the political and 
security objectives of the United States and its partners.”160 The United States was 
cognizant of having formalized economic ties that Singapore valued highly was a sure 
means to better consolidate the island-state as a steadfast supporter of the United States.  
                                                 
154 Storey, Southeast Asia and Rise of China: The Search for Security, 242. 
155 Koh and Chang, The United States Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 8. 
156 Pang, “Embedding Security into Free Trade,” 3. 
157 Ibid.  
158 Pang, The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 2.  
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 1. 
 33
While the non-economic benefits of the USSFTA were significant, the conclusion 
of this agreement certainly had economic benefits for the United States. Although 
Singapore had a comparatively smaller economic footprint, the potential of Singapore’s 
trade relations and other related aspects meant that it was a viable economic gain for the 
global power. At the time of signing the FTA, Singapore was America’s 11th largest 
world trading partner and the largest in Southeast Asia; the United States had 1,500 
companies in Singapore, with its investment in the island-state a staggering US$30 
billion to-date.161 Clearly, economics was on the mind of U.S. leaders. The signing of the 
USSFTA would also serve as a signal to other countries in the region of the immense 
business opportunities that America presented, thereby boosting its own economy.  
b. Reasons for Singapore to Sign the USSFTA with the United States 
Singapore signed the USSFTA with the United States for strategic and economic 
reasons. From the strategic viewpoint, Singapore wanted to enmesh U.S. interests in the 
region permanently through mechanisms such as the FTA, thereby resulting in a need for 
the United States to remain in Southeast Asia, creating a stable and peaceful region.162 
As mentioned in Chapter I, Singapore had long been a vocal advocate for the U.S. 
presence in the region, viewing the United States as a benign power that would help 
maintain the balance of power in view of the rise of regional powers like China, India, 
and Japan. The signing of this USSFTA would also signal U.S. commitment and support 
to the region, given that there were many layers of bureaucracy and sectors of the U.S. 
business community that these agreements went through before they were passed. As 
Ambassador Koh nicely summed up, the signing of the USSFTA “enhanced the prospects 
of peace and security in the region.”163  
From the economic perspective, Singapore was well aware of its dependency on 
international trade. According to Pang, Singapore’s economic security strategy was to 
promote the signing of regional trade agreements and to sign FTAs with the ten most 
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advanced economies in the world.164 Through such channels, Singapore hoped that it 
would be able to tap “friction-free, duty-free preferential trade gains, regardless of the 
outcome of the WTO-, APEC-, and AFTA-driven liberalization.”165 The ineffectiveness 
of the World Trade Organization ministerial meetings in Doha and Cancun in 2001 and 
2003, respectively, had dampened Singapore’s hope of accomplishing trade liberalization 
through the multilateral route.166 The signing of the USSFTA fit into its economic 
strategy of establishing FTAs beyond the region of ASEAN, thereby creating more 
economic options for the tiny island-state.167 The 287.7 million people in America with a 
per capita income of US$36,273 would also provide Singapore with a massive market, 
especially at a season where the economic outlook seemed pessimistic for the region.168  
C. SUMMARY 
The U.S.-Singapore relationship during the Bush administration was characterized 
by the GWOT, with formalized agreements like the SFA and USSFTA coming into force. 
This chapter has discussed the causal factors that have made both countries look to each 
other in the areas of defense and economic cooperation, areas that had been the 
foundation of their stable relations. Based on the discussion, it is clear that the strongest 
factor driving cooperation is the broad range of security interests. Primarily borne out of 
the desire for a peaceful and secure region, both sides have shared a common interest in 
cooperation that includes strategic and security imperatives. Meanwhile, economic 
reasons feature prominently, although it would seem that both countries view that 
economic prosperity and development are only possible when a peaceful and secure 
geopolitical environment exists. Finally, the regard for a rules-based international order is 
evident as both countries have sought to use binding agreements like the SFA and the 
USSFTA to build upon their relations. Nevertheless, it would seem that this factor was a 
by-product rather than a driving force for the stable relations.  
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III. U.S.-SINGAPORE RELATIONS UNDER PRESIDENT 
BARACK OBAMA 
During President Obama’s tenure from 2009 to 2016, relations between the 
United States and Singapore picked up momentum. The close relations could be observed 
through the frequent high-level meetings between the political elites of both countries. 
The U.S. State dinner for Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on August 2, 2016—the only 
Southeast Asian leader to be given the honor by President Obama during his two terms in 
office—summed up the excellent bilateral relations between the two countries. The 
signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2015 and the 
ongoing discussions of the TPP were the significant dealings for the two countries during 
the period, with these collaborations representing mutual interests in security and defense 
as well as economic areas. Bilateral relations were also helped by a renewed U.S. interest 
in Asia that came to be known as the “U.S. rebalancing toward Asia” in 2011, which saw 
more U.S. emphasis being placed on the region.169  
This chapter examines significant areas in the security and economic cooperation 
involving both countries during this period and identifies the underlying reasons for 
positive bilateral relations. 
A. SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
The area of security and defense remained a key tenet in U.S.-Singapore bilateral 
relations during Obama’s tenure. On the global front, the common threat of global 
terrorism remained, with the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
causing worldwide alarm given the nature of its operations and ability to recruit members 
through the use of social media. Within the region, the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea between China and the four ASEAN member states continued to create 
instability, posing security issues for both Singapore and the United States. Defense 
relations for both countries took a positive step with the signing of the EDCA in 
December 2015, providing evidence of common interests that both parties had to create a 
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stable, peaceful region. This section utilizes the EDCA to expound on the reasons 
underlying the stable relations from the security and defense perspective. 
1. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement  
The EDCA provided “a new framework for an expanded defense relationship 
between the two countries.”170 Signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and 
Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen at the Pentagon in December 2015, the 
agreement was touted as an elevation of defense relations, with its conclusion marking 
the 25th anniversary of the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding and the 10th 
anniversary of the SFA between the two countries. The new EDCA provided the overlay 
for five significant sectors of defense cooperation, namely “military, policy, strategic and 
technological spheres, as well as cooperation against non-conventional security 
challenges, such as piracy and transnational terrorism.”171 The agreement also formalized 
and expanded cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
cyber defense, biosecurity and public communications. High-level dialogues were also 
instituted between both sides.172 
The EDCA was a concrete, formalized agreement between the United States and 
Singapore with clear benefits being put forth by officials from both parties. There were, 
however, implicit interests that both nations had in mind while deciding to push forward 
the cooperation. The following two sections discuss the reasons as to why both countries 
deemed it necessary to put pen to paper in this agreement.  
a. Reasons for the United States to Sign the EDCA with Singapore 
The United States had strategic reasons for signing the EDCA with Singapore. 
The global superpower had announced its intention to rebalance toward Asia and needed 
partners from all parts of Asia to welcome this strategy. In the past, Singapore had proven 
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itself a firm supporter of greater U.S. presence and involvement in the region, and the 
signing of the EDCA with the island-state would help consolidate its support. Singapore 
had also been largely valued for its “advice on issues like the East Asia Summit, trade, 
the South China Sea, and a host of other regional security and economic issues.”173 The 
importance of Singapore had become even more critical given that the two U.S. treaty 
allies in the region, Thailand and the Philippines, had experienced political instability 
over the years that had undermined the strength of their alliance with the United States. 
Thailand had been destabilized by military coups in 2006 and 2014, was ruled by a 
military junta at the time Obama’s term ended, and had not announced the date for 
democratic elections; on the other hand, the Philippines, whose ties with the United 
States had improved under of the presidency of Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), faced 
domestic opposition for the ratification of its own version of the EDCA with the United 
States.174 In contrast, the stability of Singapore’s foreign policy in the middle term under 
the continuous rule of the People’s Action Party (PAP) provided both the predictability 
and firm foundation that the Obama administration could rely upon.  
The American signing of the EDCA was also meant to strengthen its bilateral 
relationship with Singapore. This relationship was clearly an important one for the United 
States given Singapore’s excellent geographical location that was logistically useful for 
the U.S. military in this part of the world and the island-state’s strong support for U.S. 
military initiatives. Singapore had long been a steadfast and reliable partner for the U.S. 
military, increasingly since the signing of the 1990 MOU, with U.S. Navy’s Littoral 
Combat Ships and the P-8 Poseidon aircraft being two of the latest assets being deployed 
in Singapore.175 Such support remained vital for the U.S. military in Asia as the island-
state’s geographical position meant that it was a good launching pad for American 
operations in the region. The United States also wanted to keep bilateral defense relations 
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strong as a way to reinforce Singapore’s continued support in its international endeavors. 
The many ongoing bilateral exercises undertaken by each of the branches in the two 
militaries, such as Exercise TIGER BALM for the armies, Exercise COMMANDO 
SLING for the air forces, and Exercise CARAT for the navies, were a means to achieve 
good defense relations, something that both countries valued. These exercises not only 
allowed for better cooperation and understanding of how each military functioned, they 
also instilled better interoperability between them, allowing more seamless cooperation 
when it came to joint operations.  
The United States had also signed the EDCA with Singapore given the island-
state’s high regard for a rules-based international order, something that America valued. 
Singapore’s push for this order could be seen from its public stance, with Prime Minister 
Lee remarking in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 that “all countries, 
big and small, must observe international law.”176 The island-state had all along touted its 
membership in the United Nations as being beneficial to small nations like itself, where 
the “U.N. Charter’s principles of sovereign equality, the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of states” were critical for its own 
survivability.177 In other regional affairs like the SCS territorial disputes, both countries 
had been aligned in the manner that the issue should be resolved via a rules-based 
international framework.178 Both countries had been vocal about the need to respect the 
freedom of navigation in the affected waters and urged for a peaceful resolution on the 
matter.179 The United States was thus keen to move closer to Singapore, a country that it 
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deemed to share similar values in this aspect and was a member of the region in which 
America was keen to exert its influence and ideals.  
The United States had also signed the EDCA with Singapore for a less direct 
imperative—that of countering Chinese influence in the region. In a statement made before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015, Green had noted that U.S. “grand strategy” 
in the Asia-Pacific was to guard against any other nation from becoming a hegemonic power 
in the region, and he specifically pointed out China as “the greatest source of uncertainty in 
Asia today.”180 In the early years of the Obama administration, China had increased tensions 
with its maritime neighbors over the ongoing claims of disputed territories like the Senkaku 
Islands with Japan, Scarborough Shoal with the Philippines, and the Paracel Islands with 
Vietnam. The contentious 2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, in which no communique 
was issued for the first time in ASEAN’s history, reportedly due to China’s backend 
intervention to prevent statements on SCS,181 as well as Chinese proclamation of the nine-
dash line and the air defense identification zone,182 created perceptions that China was about 
to challenge the status quo in the region. Washington has long regarded Singapore as a 
country with a unique standing and as a possible interlocutor for the United States and China, 
with Vice President Joseph Biden acknowledging in 2013 that “Singapore is friends with 
America, also with India, Japan, and China and the other major powers.”183 Moreover, the 
Obama administration also identified Asia as a strategic priority and made considerable 
efforts to provide high-level representation at regional multilateral meetings such as the 
ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit, as well as to improve its relations with its allies 
in both East and Southeast Asia.184 In securing Singapore as a strategic defense partner, the 
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United States could be seen as strengthening the good, strong, and steadfast relations that it 
had in the region, which also provided a counter-balance to China’s rising might and 
influence in Asia.  
b.  Reasons for Singapore to Sign the EDCA with the United States 
Singapore’s strategic reasons for concluding the EDCA with the United States 
remained similar to the ones that it had in 2005 when the SFA was signed. These 
underlying preferences were aligned to what the Singapore leaders had long believed in 
after the Cold War, that “a strong U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific [was] vital for 
regional security.”185 Regional events that took place during Obama’s tenure reinforced 
these perceptions. The uncertainty over the rise of China, the issues in the Korean 
Peninsula, and the continued threat of terrorism in the form of ISIL were the emerging 
factors that had threatened to upset peace and stability in the region in the years of 
Obama’s administration. Singapore’s leaders at all levels had constantly voiced the 
island-state’s support for U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, with Prime Minister Lee going 
so far as to intimate that regional leaders had expressed in private their support for U.S. 
involvement in the region, although they had avoided voicing it publicly.186 Signing the 
EDCA with the United States would provide Singapore with a strengthened U.S. military 
commitment to the region, which in the mind of Singapore, continued to be critical to the 
island-state’s security. 
Singapore’s signing of the EDCA with the United States was also meant to bolster 
its own security in view of possible threats coming from its neighborhood. Lynn Kuok 
has suggested that U.S.-Singapore cooperation like the EDCA could be seen as an 
extended form of deterrence toward potential aggressors.187 While there appeared to be 
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improving bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, the occasional barbs sent 
Singapore’s way had made the island-state realize that good bilateral relations with its 
neighbors might not be a fixture in the long haul.188 Given the thinly veiled threats that 
had often come from Malaysia and Indonesia under their previous political leaders, such 
as Mahathir and Habibie, it would be naïve of Singapore to believe that such negative 
sentiments against the island-state would not resurface in the future. The signing of the 
EDCA, which could be seen as an extension of the SFA, would help send the unspoken 
message to Singapore’s potential adversaries of U.S. military and political support should 
a crisis befalls on the island-state.189 
Singapore’s reasons for signing the EDCA would certainly include its continued 
desire to be in a trusted, privileged position with the United States where it could 
continue to gain access to advanced technology and valuable training space.190 Given its 
lack of strategic depth, Singapore had often sought to create force multipliers through the 
use of advanced technology. To this end, Singapore had very often looked to the United 
States as a source of advanced weaponry, as mentioned earlier in Chapter II. A good 
example would be Singapore’s participation as a Security Cooperation Partner in the 
Joint Strike Fighter program, which Defense Minister Ng remarked on as having “the 
potential to be the most advanced multi-role fighter aircraft for decades to come.”191 
Singapore had been a part of the program since 2004, and it was this trusted relationship 
with the United States that allowed the island-state to be in a position to consider the 
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purchase.192 In terms of training areas and opportunities, Singapore’s military, especially 
the RSAF, continued to rely on land areas provided by the United States for its training. 
Such training opportunities had allowed Singapore to overcome its scarcity of training 
space, both air and land, and enhanced its military operational readiness.  
B. ECONOMIC 
In the economic and trade arena, the United States and Singapore sought to build 
upon their strong existing linkages. Since the signing of the USSFTA in 2003, both 
countries continued to seek opportunities to expand their economic cooperation. The 
economic partnership could be best observed through the negotiation of the TPP, which 
was also argued by some to be the most visible economic tenet of the Obama 
administration’s rhetoric describing the U.S. rebalance toward Asia.  
1. Trans-Pacific Partnership  
The TPP was a multilateral trade agreement meant to create new trade and 
investment opportunities for its signatory nations. The agreement brought together a total 
of 12 economies from both sides of the Pacific (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam).193 
The agreement started off in 2006 as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, 
more commonly called the Pacific 4 (P4) arrangement, comprising Singapore, Brunei, 
Chile, and New Zealand. In 2008, countries like the United States indicated their interest 
in negotiating an FTA with the P4, and this FTA came to be known subsequently as the 
TPP. Malaysia, Canada, Japan, and others joined the arrangement subsequently. As a 
collective whole, these twelve countries take up 40 percent of global gross domestic 
product, one-third of international trade, and are home to 800 million people, making this 
arrangement the largest trade agreement at the time it was proposed.  
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The TPP was meant to be a high-standard and well-rounded agreement that would 
help “promote economic growth; support the creation and retention of jobs; enhance 
innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in 
[participating] countries; and promote transparency, good governance, and enhanced 
labor and environmental protections.”194 Other than its much spoken about trade benefits, 
the design of the TPP was also meant to entrench the region’s commitment to a rules-
based trading system by bringing to-date the rules concerning international trade and 
investment.195 The participating nations had hoped that this agreement would help create 
an open trade environment with integration of markets within the Asia-Pacific region. 
The TPP was also designed in such a way that it would be willing to take in new member 
economies as long as the standards of the agreement were being met by the interested 
nations. The pursuit of the TPP, a multilateral agreement consisting of ten other nations, 
represents something bigger through which we might glean the reasons for the stability of 
the close U.S.-Singapore relationship. 
a. Reasons for the United States to Sign the TPP 
The Obama administration had U.S. interests from multiple angles in mind when 
signing the TPP. First, the United States signed the TPP for economic reasons. While it 
remained a world economic power, America knew clearly that it had to seek 
opportunities elsewhere in the world to sustain its leading economic position. The United 
States was aware of the vast potential of foreign markets, which it predicted to consist of 
more than 90 percent of the consumers in the world, and where 80 percent of the 
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purchasing power resided.196 The United States had long identified the Asia-Pacific as a 
region with strong growth potential. In her comments at the Progressive Policy Institute’s 
event on the TPP, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker highlighted that the TPP would 
allow Americans to tap into the high-growth markets in Asia-Pacific that would in turn 
help boost the U.S. economy.197 According to the U.S. Trade Representative website, the 
signing of the TPP would also support “more Made-in-America exports and higher-
paying American jobs.”198 The elimination of more than 18,000 taxes placed on 
American products by countries around the globe would allow the agricultural and 
manufacturing industries as well as small enterprises to prevail over its competitors from 
the developing world.199 These would be critical to the U.S. economy at a time where 
global growth was seemingly slowing down.  
Second, the United States had strategic reasons aimed at maintaining its influence 
and ability to lead the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama had articulated the rebalance 
to Asia focus shortly after taking office, with the sub-region of Southeast Asia recognized 
to be of increasing importance. The United States had acknowledged its position in the 
world as “a leader in the Asia-Pacific” and that the TPP partners “rely on a strong U.S. 
presence for everything from keeping the seas open for trade to protecting their territorial 
integrity to supporting closer economic integration.”200 Furthermore, the United States 
had viewed China to be a rival in the economic realm with its own multilateral trade 
initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and One Belt, 
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One Road that were meant to engage the region.201 These moves from China would 
likely increase its influence in the region, especially so if the TPP did not remain on the 
table. Given that trade was of critical importance in many of these economies, America’s 
leading position in the Asia-Pacific would diminish in the long term causing it to have 
lesser influence on the region; this diminished influence would then affect its world 
leader status given Asia’s relative size to other parts of the world.  
Third, the signing of the TPP would allow the United States to shape trade rules 
and global norms that would aid the U.S. economy and bolster U.S. economic interests. 
The Obama administration noted that there had been more than 100 trade deals signed in 
the Asia-Pacific region since the turn of the century, with many of them creating an 
uneven landscape in the form of higher tariffs that resulted in American companies’ 
inability to compete.202 In addition, many countries around the globe still did not adhere 
to basic labor laws and respect intellectual property rights, which were interests 
fundamental to America’s economic well-being. China’s own version of a multilateral 
trade deal in the form of RCEP did not seem to abide by the rules that the United States 
held in high regard. Obama described it as a trade deal that “won’t prevent unfair 
competition among government-subsidized, state-owned enterprises,” “won’t protect a 
free and open Internet,” “nor will it respect intellectual property rights in a way that 
ensures America’s creators, artists, filmmakers and entrepreneurs get their due,” “and it 
certainly won’t enforce high standards for our workers and our environment.”203 Through 
the TPP, the United States had sought to seize the initiative to change the standard of 
doing trade with its member nations. These measures, if followed and enforced, would 
help the United States improve on the competitiveness of its economy that had seen 
others, like China’s, catching up. The open nature of the TPP, which members from 
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outside the grouping were free to join as long as they could meet the standards, would 
also help to improve the rules-based order that the United States advocated for.  
b. Reasons for Singapore to Sign the TPP 
Singapore had clear economic reasons for advocating the TPP initiative. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, Singapore’s lack of hinterland and small domestic markets 
meant that it was extremely reliant on international trade and commerce. To this end, the 
TPP would give Singapore companies an increased foothold in some of the biggest 
markets in the world, like those of America and Japan, and help to open new doors with 
countries like Canada and Mexico, where there were no existing formalized trade 
agreements.204 As minister of trade and industry, Lim Hng Kiang remarked following the 
agreement of the deal in 2015, the TPP “[would] transform the region by reducing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers substantially for both goods and services, encouraging greater 
investment, and addressing new trade challenges in the modern economy.”205 These 
changes would largely benefit Singapore’s trade-based economy.  
Singapore also had strategic reasons for signing the TPP. The island-state 
believed that the TPP would create entrenched interests for the United States.206 The U.S. 
participation in the agreement was significant in and of itself, given that its economy was 
the largest in the world and it continued to exert global geopolitical influence. Singapore 
had wanted the United States to continue with its economic involvement in the region, 
where these interests in turn served as a compelling and galvanizing factor for the global 
superpower to sustain, if not strengthen, its commitment.207 Prime Minister Lee had 
made a personal effort to lobby for U.S. ratification of the TPP, going as far as to say that 
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the failure to ratify “would be a very big setback for America.”208 The same could be said 
for the other member nations of the TPP, where intertwined economic interests would 
arguably lower the possibility of conflict, thereby creating a peaceful region that would 
attract more trade and investment from all over the world. Furthermore, the inclusive 
nature of the TPP meant that there could still be an opportunity for large economies like 
China and South Korea to participate in this agreement at a subsequent time, thereby 
bringing on more countries. This was a step in the right direction from the perspective of 
Singapore as regional peace and stability had long been identified by the island-state to 
be critical conditions for the state’s economic activities to take place, if not flourish.  
Singapore’s signing of the TPP was also a means for the island-state to promote a 
rules-based international order in the economic arena, which in the minds of the 
Singapore leaders, was critical for the development of its economy. According to the 
Economic Development Board of Singapore, its strategy was to “[extend] Singapore’s 
value proposition to businesses not just to help them improve their bottom line, but also 
to help them grow their top line through establishing and deepening strategic activities in 
Singapore to drive their business, innovation and talent objectives in Asia and 
globally.”209 Singapore’s heavy reliance on trade activities for its economy meant that the 
trade rules embedded in the TPP to promote fair competition and good governance would 
create a better landscape for its businesses among the member nations of the TPP, where 
artificial barriers to entry in the likes of unfair business practices would be eradicated.210 
Moreover, the agreement to protect intellectual property under the ambit of the TPP was 
crucial to Singapore as well, given that its knowledge-based economy would have a legal 
and observed mechanism among the TPP nations to fall back on to safeguard its business 
innovations.211 Overall, these provisions in the agreement would help the island-state 
gain better access to other economies; at the same time, the legal measures would serve to 
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create a more level playing field to protect Singapore’s firms’ interests vis-à-vis 
companies in TPP-member economies.  
C. SUMMARY 
During the Obama administration, the U.S.-Singapore relationship was 
characterized by closer bilateral relations, helped by the U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy 
that was spearheaded by the president himself. The EDCA was signed to help strengthen 
defense and security cooperation between the two countries, and the TPP was seen as a 
means to further the economic interests of both nations. Defense and economic interests 
were important foundations of their bilateral relations. Based on the discussion in this 
chapter, we can identify the area of defense and security was the critical factor driving 
cooperation between the two countries, in part due to the uncertainty created by China’s 
rise and its assertiveness in the SCS. Both countries continually identified their long-term 
interests as peace and stability in the region. Meanwhile, economic interests featured 
prominently, although these interests did not seem to be on the same level as security and 
defense interests. With the already close U.S.-Singapore economic relations in place, the 
TPP that was being negotiated was part of a wider initiative to bring in free trade among 
other regional economies that would help give rise to more economic activities and a 
level playing field. Finally, the pursuance of a rules-based international order was also 
evident as both countries called for a region that was governed by commonly agreed-
upon rules, both in the dispute resolution and the economic arenas. This aspect seemed to 
increase during Obama’s tenure due to increased international uncertainty resulting from 




The analysis of the three possible factors behind the stable and incrementally 
stronger U.S.-Singapore relations under the tenures of Presidents Bush and Obama 
reveals that they each play a part, albeit to varying extents. This chapter first summarizes 
the findings regarding the underlying factors of this stable relationship to answer the 
research question and evaluate the three hypotheses. Second, this chapter characterizes 
the long-term relationship between the United States and Singapore and looks at 
scenarios in which these stable relations might be affected.  
A. ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESES AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on the evidence and analysis laid down in the earlier chapters, it is clear 
that stable U.S.-Singapore relations are driven by a confluence of factors in the areas of 
security, economic interests, and a preference for a rules-based international order. While 
these factors were present in the case studies, it was clear that there were times when 
some of the factors featured more prominently than others. This section summarizes the 
findings for each variable in turn and assesses their respective hypotheses.  
1. Broad Range of Common Security Interests 
U.S.-Singapore relations are predominantly based on a broad range of common 
security interests. This factor could be easily distinguished in all the case studies that 
featured in the earlier chapters, with security and defense reasons being identified as one 
of the underlying reasons by both countries. This observation is understandable, given 
that without an overall peaceful and secure region and world at large, there would be little 
room for other interests to exist, let alone flourish.  
Under President Bush’s tenure, both the United States and Singapore primarily 
prioritized security and defense concerns. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 
2001, combating global terrorism was a key concern for the Bush administration, and 
there was a critical need to rally supporters for this effort. The identification of Southeast 
Asia as a critical second front in the war on terror meant that the United States needed 
 50
countries in the vicinity to lend weight to its effort. Singapore did so, arguably with much 
of its own initiative and great enthusiasm. The island-state, for its part, was also 
concerned about the rise of terrorism happening in its own backyard and wanted to be 
part of a much wider global effort to eradicate terrorists, especially those that posed a 
threat to its immediate interests. The extensive U.S. operations in East Asia also meant 
that the United States was keen to secure Singapore as a close defense partner, especially 
given the excellent geographical location of the island-state from which the U.S. military 
had benefited by way of logistical support. As for Singapore, its political leaders under 
the ruling PAP continued to view the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia as critical for 
maintaining the peace and stability of the region. With its sometimes unfriendly 
neighbors, Singapore considered having a superpower seemingly on good, close terms 
would provide an additional deterrent effect to its overall defense strategy. Given 
Singapore’s lack of training space and its relatively small defense industry, a close 
relationship with America would also translate to the use of U.S. land for military 
training purposes as well as privileged access to U.S. advanced military technology. The 
signing of the FTA could also be seen as a means for the United States to enhance its 
influence in the region, something that was seen to be of strategic importance, especially 
in the face of a rising China. Singapore, on the other hand, viewed this FTA as a signal of 
commitment whereby the United States would now be more supportive of its interests in 
the region, which would translate to continued presence that, in the eyes of Singapore, 
ensured peace and security.  
Under President Obama’s tenure, defense and security interests continued to be of 
critical importance for both countries. The U.S. signing of the EDCA with Singapore 
could be seen as one of its concrete steps supporting its rebalance to Asia strategy, as it 
sought to seek legitimacy for its military presence in the region. The EDCA also allowed 
the United States to extend its use—both in terms of time and in scope—of Singapore’s 
military facilities for its military. This development was considered extremely important 
for the U.S. military, given the wide-ranging operations that it conducted in this part of 
the world. For Singapore, its leaders continued to regard the United States as an 
important superpower whose presence in the region was a key stabilizing factor. It has 
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continued to view the close relationship with the United States as an important deterrence 
factor for would-be aggressors as well as a conduit to gain valuable access to advanced 
training technologies and training space. The U.S.’s signing of the TPP would provide the 
foundation for the United States to maintain its influence and ability to lead the region, as 
its leaders recognized the trade deal to have strategic and defense implications beyond 
just economic ones. Security in Asia was also important for the United States given its 
interests in the region. On the other hand, Singapore had wanted to use the TPP to 
safeguard the peace and security of the region given that a multilateral agreement of this 
nature would mean that countries with entrenched economic interests would find it more 
costly to engage in conflicts.  
In all, hypothesis one is strongly supported by empirical evidence that shows that 
the broad range of defense and security interests between the two countries is a strong 
driving factor for the stable and increasingly stronger bilateral relations. Even in the 
realms of economic agreements, the two countries’ motivations could be traced to their 
security imperatives, a fact which on its own is telling of its importance. None of the 
other factors features as strongly as the reasons of security and defense.  
2. Broad Range of Common Economic Interests 
Common economic interests between the United States and Singapore do appear 
as a factor for their stable bilateral relations, with the caveat that these interests did not 
feature as strongly as reasons from the defense and security realm. Given the blossoming 
international trade front, both countries were keen to push the boundaries of global trade 
that would benefit themselves economically. For the United States, it was a case of 
seeking new opportunities with Singapore and the Asia-Pacific region; for Singapore, it 
was a case of economic survival, given that its livelihood was very much dependent on 
global trade. 
Under President Bush’s tenure, the stable bilateral relations could be attributed to 
stronger economic cooperation as observed from the signing of the USSFTA. This 
FTA—America’s first with an Asian country—was important given that Singapore was 
America’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia itself. The United States had wanted 
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to utilize the USSFTA as a springboard for other FTAs with members in the region, 
clearly showing its interests to expand economic opportunities for itself. Singapore’s 
reliance on international trade, three times its gross domestic product,212 was well-
documented and the completion of an FTA with the United States would open up various 
economic opportunities for the island-state that could only bode well for the nation. 
During the same period, Singapore was also concerned about the rise of terrorism 
following the September 11 attacks and the uncovering of JI operatives and their planned 
attacks in the country. This was of concern to the Singapore government as any possible 
attacks would cause disruption to the island-state’s economic activities and lower 
investors’ confidence, which would inevitably result in the economy taking a hit. The 
island-state’s support for the U.S. GWOT was thus in part due to its economic interests.  
During President Obama’s two-term tenure, economic interests shared by both 
countries could be seen through the way they pushed for the conclusion of the TPP. The 
Obama administration clearly saw the economic benefits of such an agreement for the 
American people, noting in particular the vast market potential of Asia, the creation of 
more jobs for Americans, as well as how its industries would be able to compete more 
effectively. Similarly, Singapore continued to view free trade as a cornerstone of the 
country’s well-being and was keen for the TPP to come into force. While the existing 
USSFTA meant that the TPP would only result in incremental benefits for bilateral 
economic ties, the multilateral TPP represented clear common economic interests for 
both countries that would help further their trade ties with other countries in this 
grouping.  
In all, hypothesis two is clearly supported by two of the case studies that were 
presented in the earlier chapters—the USSFTA and the TPP. The potential negative 
effects of terrorism on the economy also influenced Singapore’s thinking when it chose 
to support the U.S. GWOT. Economic interests could be assessed as important for both 
countries as they sought to improve their respective country’s economic prospects and 
prosperity.  
                                                 
 212 “Trade (% of GDP),” World Bank, accessed January 3, 2017, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.  
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3. A Common Worldview, Notably the High Emphasis on a Rules-Based 
International Order 
The United States and Singapore also shared a common worldview, in particular, 
for a rules-based international order. This observation could be made in the TPP and 
EDCA case studies that were presented in the earlier chapters. However, although the 
formation of a rules-based international order was clearly an important one for both 
countries, it featured as a peripheral factor as opposed to the first two hypotheses.  
The high regard for a rules-based order was more evident during Obama’s 
presidency than Bush’s. During the Obama administration, the pursuit of the TPP 
provided a good opportunity for the United States to play an active role in the shaping of 
trade rules and norms. The setting of global standards in the area of trade was particularly 
important for the United States given that its firms were facing an unleveled playing field 
with a rise in trading practices that were deemed unfair from its perspective. Moreover, 
China’s meteoric economic rise and its apparent disregard for fair trading practices were 
also hindering the U.S. economy. The implementation of the TPP, with its large global 
share of markets, would rectify some of these aspects and help U.S. firms stay 
competitive. For Singapore, the creation of trade rules among the members of the TPP 
was also a step in the right direction, especially given that its economy was moving up 
the economic value chain. The island-state’s knowledge-based economy would benefit 
from the legal protection of its innovation and intellectual property with proper rules put 
in place, thereby protecting its business interests and increasing its economic 
competitiveness. Separately, the U.S. signing of the EDCA with Singapore could also be 
seen as a means to consolidate the island-state’s support for a rules-based international 
order. The global power was keen to bring together like-minded nations such as 
Singapore that showed both a high regard and outward support for international matters 
to be adjudicated through a common, respected set of rules and norms. Singapore would 
welcome the push for adherence of a rules-based international order, knowing full well 
that that was critical for its survival, especially given its status as a small state. 
In all, hypothesis three is supported by the case study of the TPP, with some 
empirical evidence also seen by the United States signing the EDCA. Compared with the 
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other two hypotheses, hypothesis three does feature, but not as prominently, in U.S.-
Singapore relations.  
4. Addressing the Research Question 
In response to the research question of what are the underlying factors driving the 
stable relations between the United States and Singapore, this research concludes that the 
presence of common security interests, common economic interests, as well as the high 
regard for a rules-based international order all played a part, albeit to varying degrees. 
The main driving factor, as this paper submits, would be that both countries shared a 
broad range of common security interests. These security interests were fundamental in 
their coming together as partners, as the need for each other’s attributes and abilities 
created an incentive for both parties to cooperate and collaborate, thereby resulting in 
stable relations. Moreover, the other areas of common interests that both countries had 
helped to reinforce this stable bilateral relations across both the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-SINGAPORE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP  
The stable relationship between the United States and Singapore could be 
characterized as one of enduring, aligned interests. These interests have been identified 
by both countries as the cornerstone of their bilateral ties that were critical to each 
nation’s well-being. Going forward, the stable bilateral relationship could possibly be 
affected if there were to be changes in the following areas. 
Scenario 1. Singapore experiences a radical change in domestic politics. The 
steadfast position of support for U.S. ties is in part due to the continued rule of the PAP 
government, which has been in power since the island-state’s independence in 1965. If 
Singapore were to experience a change in government, there would be a possibility that 
whoever might take over could shift away from the established foreign policy position of 
the PAP, that of ensuring stable ties with the United States. In this context, domestic 
politics in Singapore could result in a different, if not unstable, bilateral relationship with 
the United States. In the absence of such a radical change in domestic politics, there is 
unlikely to be any change in the way Singapore defines the security and economic 
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interests that have underpinned its cooperation with the United States. Therefore, any 
change in the bilateral relationship is most likely to come from the United States. 
Scenario 2. The United States unilaterally creates political tension in the Asia-
Pacific region. With regional peace and security highly regarded by the Singapore, it 
would be clear that any attempt to upset the regional stability would be denounced by the 
island-state. To this end, if the United States sought to go head-to-head with any of the 
larger Asian nations, such as China, that results in a need for the island-state to take sides, 
it would be expected that Singapore might distance itself from the United States and 
rethink the viability of the relationship. As its Foreign Minister Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan 
mentioned in Parliament, Singapore “cannot be at the beck and call … of any single 
superpower … do not force [Singapore] to make invidious choices.”213  
Scenario 3. The United States withdraws from Asia. Singapore had warmly 
welcomed U.S. presence in Southeast Asia since 1990, in part due to its belief that the 
United States was a benign power. If the United States were to reduce, or worse, remove 
its presence entirely from the Asia-Pacific region, there would be reduced common 
security interests between both countries. Moreover, if the United States were to take on 
an economically protectionist policy stance that reduces its international trade, there 
would likely be weakened economic cooperation and collaboration with Singapore. 
Interesting to note, President Donald Trump had in his early days of administration 
signed an executive order to withdraw the United States from the TPP. While this might 
not largely affect U.S.-Singapore trade relations given that there is an existing bilateral 
FTA in place, such developments would understandably diminish synergy across bilateral 
ties and, in turn, create uncertainty in the relationship. For Singapore, there might be 
long-run ramifications given its extremely trade-dependent economy.  
Scenario 4. The United States ceases to be a Pacific power. If the United States 
were to suffer from a decline as a global power, it would likely relinquish many of its 
international commitments, not least its resources in Asia, which would include its 
                                                 
 213 “Singapore-China Relations not a Zero-sum Game, Says Foreign Minister,” Channel NewsAsia, 
January 9, 2017, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-china-relations-not-a-zero-
sum-game-says-foreign/3424732.html.  
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involvement with Singapore. With less at stake in Asia both militarily and economically, 
the U.S. stance would possibly erode cooperation between the two countries that would 
in turn mean reduced common space. Fewer interactions might result in fewer common 
interests being identified by both parties, thereby resulting in less ground for common 
understanding on matters of importance. This might result in some form of open 
disagreements that might affect their stable relations.  
C. CONCLUSION 
U.S.-Singapore relations have stood out in comparison to the relationships that the 
United States has with other Southeast Asia countries. The stability and the strength of 
their relations would have seemed unlikely given the many differences—cultural, 
geography, history—that both countries have. That being said, it is to the credit of both 
nations that despite these differences, they are able to find common and enduring 
interests that would not only benefit each of the country, but also provide some form of 
synergy that serves to further these interests. The partnership between the United States 
and Singapore is one that deserves special attention in the current geopolitical 
environment, given that its strength could be argued to be stronger than some of the treaty 
alliances that the United States has with its allies. In order for these stable U.S.-Singapore 
relations be maintained and nurtured, the United States must show a sustained 
commitment not just in terms of steps to improve bilateral ties, but also in areas that have 
an indirect implication on this relationship. America’s ability to conduct its relations with 
China and its ability to remain sensitive to ASEAN matters and norms would be critical 
for bilateral relations, given Singapore’s high regard for these two areas. The island-state 
must be given its autonomy and flexibility to conduct its diplomacy, and not be made nor 
perceived as a puppet of the United States, which in itself would not be useful for the 
United States. Singapore, on its part, would have to conduct itself amicably in the realm 
of international relations and continue to be able to punch above its weight. Singapore 
should seek to find avenues to provide good value propositions for the United States—be 
it in terms of geopolitical support for U.S. global initiatives, a bridge for U.S.-ASEAN or 
U.S.-China relations, or simply a military logistical hub—that would make it a valued 
partner for the United States.  
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